GREECE-TURKEY AEGEAN DISPUTES: A SHORT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001475
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU, GR
SUBJECT: GREECE-TURKEY AEGEAN DISPUTES: A SHORT
RETROSPECTIVE ON THE ICJ OPTION
REF: A. ATHENS 1450
B. ATHENS 1405 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: CDA TOM COUNTRYMAN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: In the wake of the May 23 midair collision
between Greek and Turkish fighters, statements by former
President Stephanopoulos to refer all Greek-Turkish Aegean
disputes to the ICJ caused a mini uproar here (ref B), but
actually represent nothing new. Over the years, Greek
government interest in going to the ICJ has waxed and waned,
depending on the ebb and flow of relations with Turkey. A
high point was reached in 1975, when both Greece and Turkey
agreed to refer the continental shelf issue, but nothing came
of it when Turkey subsequently balked. As part of his
rapprochement policy, former FM Papandreou got the EU Council
to bless Turkey's EU candidacy during the 1999 Helsinki EU
Summit, with language that the Council would refer any
outstanding differences to the ICJ by the end of 2004. With
the advent of the cautious Karamanlis government in March
2004, however, neither side has made much effort to implement
this so-called "Helsinki process." If the ICJ option has any
utility for the GoG, it is in deflecting negative
media/public opinion away from its failure to make any
substantive headway in the on-going, but moribund Aegean
exploratory talks with Turkey. This costs the GoG little,
since FM Bakoyannis recently told us that PM Erdogan was
"very far away" from discussing the ICJ (ref A). END SUMMARY.
2. (U) Former President Costis Stephanopoulos, who recently
triggered a mini uproar in the media by proposing that Greece
resolve all of its Aegean disputes with Turkey by referring
them to the International Court of Justice at The Hague (ref
B), published a follow-up to his original proposal on June 4.
He maintained that, given the impasse in Greek-Turkish
relations, and incidents like the May 23 mid-air collision of
Greek and Turkish fighter jets, which resulted in the death
of the Greek pilot, Greece must break with its diplomatic
tradition and seek a solution through an international
judicial verdict. Otherwise, he argued, the situation in the
Aegean stands to deteriorate further, with the possibility of
war increasing accordingly. Stephanopoulos also said Greece
should enlist the support of EU and non-European countries to
pressure Turkey into accepting the ICJ referral.
3. (U) The idea of referring Greek-Turkish Aegean disputes
to the ICJ is not new. Since the 1974 Turkish invasion of
Cyprus, Greek governments have had bouts of "Hague proposals"
depending on crises and the ebb and flow of relations with
Turkey. In 1975, Turkey agreed to the referral of the
continental shelf dispute to the ICJ, announced in a joint
statement by then PM Karamanlis (the uncle of the current PM)
and PM Demirel in Brussels, but subsequently backpedaled,
insisting instead on bilateral dialogue to find a "political"
solution to the dispute -- a position it has maintained, with
little change since that time. Greek politicians and
diplomats, however, have remained divided over the wisdom of
going to The Hague, even for the sole question of the
continental shelf, which Greece continues to claim is the
only outstanding issue between Athens and Ankara in the
Aegean that is not clearly settled in international law.
4. (SBU) The option of going to the ICJ remained in limbo
until the Imia/Kardak crisis of January 1996. With Turkish
commandos occupying the larger of the two Imia rocks for
several hours, U.S. diplomatic intervention defused the
situation by getting Greece and Turkey to agree on a
disengagement formula of "no flags, no ships, no troops."
Within months of the crisis, which narrowly avoided a
shooting war, Turkey was promoting the theory of "grey zones"
in the Aegean and Greek PM Simitis was inaugurating a
"step-by-step" approach to Greek-Turkish relations
suggesting, among other things, the eventual referral of the
continental shelf question to the ICJ. (Note: According to
Turkey, Aegean "grey zones" encompass islets and rocks not
specifically turned over to Greece by international treaty
and, therefore, of disputed sovereignty) End Note).
5. (SBU) During the eight years between 1996 and 2004,
Greek FM George Papandreou charted a major change of
direction in Greek-Turkish relations. He lifted Greece's
objections to Turkey's EU aspirations and energetically
supported Ankara's bid for EU candidate status, a target
achieved at the Helsinki EU Summit (December 1999), when the
EU officially accepted this status. As part of a
pre-accession phase that started at Helsinki, Turkey was
expected to contribute to the peaceful resolution of Cyprus
and Aegean issues and pursue good neighborly relations with
Greece. In fact, the summit conclusions provided that the
ATHENS 00001475 002 OF 002
European Council would review the course of Greek-Turkish
relations at the end of 2004 and recommend the referral of
any outstanding differences to the ICJ.
6. (SBU) This "Helsinki process," widely identified as the
brain child of George Papandreou -- who insisted that
"Europeanizing" Turkey was the best means to achieve good
bilateral relations -- never truly took root, as neither
Greece nor Turkey displayed much appetite to work on it.
Thus, at the end of 2004, with Greece now under the cautious
governance of PM Karamanlis, the European Council had little
to review concerning Greek-Turkish relations, and thoughts
about the ICJ were again shelved. Papandreou and his PASOK
party have since charged the Karamanlis government of
deliberately abandoning the Helsinki process and scuttling
the only way of improving Greek-Turkish relations.
7. (SBU) The Stephanopoulos proposal, coming as it did only
days before a June 9-10 trip to Istanbul by FM Dora
Bakoyannis, has re-ignited the ICJ debate with a passion,
with many, including Defense Minister Meimarakis, warning
that the country's sovereign rights cannot be subject to a
juridical process. PM Karamanlis, after a meeting with
former FM Molyviatis, an avowed skeptic concerning the ICJ,
has re-affirmed Greece's old position that the international
tribunal could be an arbitration platform solely on the
question of the continental shelf.
8. (C) Others, including opposition PASOK leader George
Papandreou and many leftwing parliamentarians, warmly
endorsed the proposal. Papandreou, who met June 7 with PM
Karamanlis to discuss Aegean issues, was reported as
supporting the extension of Greece's territorial waters under
international treaty before Greece and Turkey made any
decision to involve the ICJ. Asked June 7 if Papandreou was
advocated extending Greek territorial seas to the 12-mile
limit as provided in the Law of the Sea treaty, Papandreou
foreign policy adviser Dimitris Droutsas played down the
remarks to us, saying Papandreou had never mentioned any
specific figure and that PASOK policy had not changed.
(Comment: Most media interpreted Papandreou's remarks as
extending these waters to the 12-mile limit -- a move which
would likely provoke a sharp Turkish reaction (the Turkish
Parliament still formally regards any such extension as a
"casus belli"). Governing New Democracy politicians and the
pro-ND media castigated Papandreou for irresponsibility.
They argued that during his eight years as FM, he never
advocated such an extreme position. Our take is that
Papandreou, aware of his anemic standing in the polls and
within his party, did so to bolster his position by appearing
tough on Turkey. End Note.)
9. (C) COMMENT: Even in the unlikely event the GoG
embraced Stephanopoulos' proposal to refer all outstanding
Aegean disputes to the ICJ, the GoG believes that Turkey
would not go along. FM Bakoyannis said as much to Ambassador
at a June 5 meeting (ref A). At this point, the only utility
for the GoG we see in the ICJ option is a means to deflect
negative media/public attention away from its failure to
produce anything substantive in the on-going Aegean
exploratory talks (now in their 33rd round), compounded by
the recent midair accident.
COUNTRYMAN
http://www.thepressproject.gr/searchlabdetails.php?type=wiki&ref=06ATHENS1475
ΠΡΕΖΑ TV
2-9-2011
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