Παρασκευή, Σεπτεμβρίου 02, 2011

WIKILEAKS GREEK CABLEGATE: ΕΠΑΦΕΣ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΩΝ ΑΞΙΩΜΑΤΟΥΧΩΝ ΜΕ ΑΚΑΔΗΜΑΪΚΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΟΓΡΑΦΟΥΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΑ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ THINK TANK ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ ΚΑΙ ΙΔΙΣ ΣΕ ΣΧΕΣΗ ΜΕ ΤΟ ΙΡΑΝ.

  UNVIE AMBASSADOR SCHULTE CONSULTATIONS ON  
   
  C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001109 


SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 


UNVIE FOR AMB. SCHULTE, DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE, NEA,
ISN, AND IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2018
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, IAEA, GR
SUBJECT: UNVIE AMBASSADOR SCHULTE CONSULTATIONS ON
IRAN/IAEA ISSUES

REF: A. ATHENS 819
B. ATHENS 874

Classified By: A/POLITICAL COUNSELOR JEFF HOVENIER FOR 1.4(b) AND (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN and
International Organizations in Vienna Ambassador Greg Schulte
visited Athens on July 28 to discuss Iran-related
developments at the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), and the broad two-track approach to negotiations with
Iran and the importance of sanctions. He met with Goverment
of Greece officials, Bank of Greece officials, and preeminent
think tankers. In all of his meetings Schulte stressed the
challenges we face from Iran and emphasized the ongoing unity
between the U.S. and EU on this issue, which has helped bring
along other countries such as Russia and China. He outlined
the P5 1 proposal that EU High Commissioner Solana delivered
to Iran on June 14 and the opportunities for Iran to engage
the international community in serious negotiations. Schulte
also stressed the need to move forward with the second track,
sanctions, if Iran is looking to buy more time and not ready
to seriously negotiate, as its July 19 response in Geneva
suggests. His Greek interlocutors agreed that Iranian
nuclear developments are of concern, but emphasized greater
engagement and expressed skepticism about sanctions a3 an
effective 4ool to leverage Iranian behavior. END SUMMARY

MEETING WITH GOG OFFICIALS
---------------------------

2. (C) Schul4e, joined by Ambas3ador Speckhard, first met
with Govern-ent kf Greece (GOG) officials at a roufdtable
di3cussi/n at the Greek MFA. GOG par4icipants included
Secretary General Aristides Agathocles, Director of UN and
International Organization Affairs Ambassador Alexandros
Rallis, Acting Director for Arab Countries and the Middle
East George Ayfandis, and Ambassador Mercurios Karafotias,
former Ambassador to Iran.

3. (C) MFA Secretary General Agathocles agreed with Schulte
that we should all be deeply concerned about the possibility
of an Iran with nuclear weapon capabilities. He also agreed
that utilizing a two-track strategy is good, but focused more
on engagement than on sanctions. Agathocles suggested the
issue is "psychological," adding that we need to examine why
Iran wants this capability ) does Tehran want to use these
weapons regardless of the environment, or are they insecure
about their position in the region? The SecGen suggested the
Iranian nuclear program was driven more by the latter, noting
that neighbors such as Israel, Pakistan and India have
nuclear weapons. Agathocles asked if the U.S. is willing to
offer Iran what Tehran really feels it needs to address its
security concerns. Agathocles added that "normalizing
relation" with Iran would also help provide security.

4. (C) Former Ambassador to Iran Karafotias said he believes
there are two ways to stop Tehran's program: "annihilate the
program" or convince Tehran it is useless and they are
throwing away money. He said the latter was the only feasible
way forward. Karafotias' own view is that there are three
reasons Iran may want these capabilities.
-- 1. Fear: the only country Iran really fears is the U.S.,
followed by Israel.
-- 2. Survival of the regime: the number of people who
benefit from the current regime and thus want to ensure its
survival numbers in the millions ) including the armed
forces, paramilitary forces, the clergy, and people with
money.
-- 3. Regional Role: Iran used to be a policeman of the
region; it may be a different regime but it is the same
country. Karafotias added that from Tehran's point of view
the U.S. has lived with far worse regimes in place, why can't
Washington trust the current regime?

Karafotias suggested the U.S. seek to "build trust" with Iran
by requesting that it do specific "achievable" things. He
also recommended discrete bilateral contacts between the U.S.
and Iran.

5. (C) Agathocles added that there is a general mistrust. He
brought up Solana's visit to Geneva and noted that the
Iranians had trouble accepting that Solana could represent
the views of the U.S., EU, Russia and China. Agathocles
further noted that he would soon be meeting with the new
Iranian Ambassador to Greece, and he offered to raise any


(##)issues the U.S. wanted in (##)would
pass along (##)
(##)

SANCTIONS
---------

the GOG is skeptical of the international
community seeks to further develop
sanctions, the Security Council must be involved. Stating
that he was speaking personally, Agathocles said he doubted
any type of sanction will change Iran's mind, although he
made clear Greece will respect its EU and UN obligations in
this regard. The SecGen argued that sanctions or no
sanctions, money and business will continue to move in and
out of Iran. (Comment: We have heard similar questions about
the effectiveness of sanctions from various GOG interlocutors
End Comment.). Amb. Schulte reiterated that sanctions are
an essential part of our two-track strategy with Iran, and
that although we hope to see progress on the "cooperation
track," that requires unity and resolution with regard to the
"sanctions track."

BANK OF GREECE
--------------

7. (C) Ambassador Schulte met with Deputy Governor of the
Bank of Greece (BG, Greece's central bank) Eleni
Dendrinou-Louri. Louri was joined by two senior Bank of
Greece staff from the bank supervision group, the office
within the BG responsible for transmitting U.S., UN and EU
actions or requests related to the investigation or freezing
of assets of suspected terrorists to banks in Greece as well
as Greek bank branches outside of Greece.

8. (C) Louri explained to Ambassador Schulte that there is
one Iranian bank located in Greece: Bank Saderat. She
indicated that despite the heavy financial burden of doing
so, the Bank of Greece has launched two control operations to
scrutinize all Bank Saderat transactions over the level of
50,000 euros (see reftel). In both control operations, BG
staff has found nothing questionable and has judged Bank
Saderat to be in compliance with Greek laws and regulations.
BG bank supervisory staff, however, noted that there are
limits to what they can do. The majority of the
transactions, which are expor credits, are from China and
UAE. BG staff emphasized that it is therefore important to
make sure that countries in which transactions are based
(i.e. goods bought or sold) are also vigorously monitoring
transactions to ensure that the listed goods are actually the
ones being bought and sold. Louri indicated that the BG will
continue to conduct controls against Bank Saderat, and that
they have all the legal authorities necessary should they
need to take actions against Bank Saderat for suspicious
transactions.

9. (C) A/Deputy Economic Counselor asked whether there is any
evidence that Bank Saderat is taking advantage of the
weaknesses in Greece's anti-money laundering/terrorist
finance regime as noted in the 2007 FATF report. BG
supervision staff indicated that Bank Saderat's Athens branch
is small, but that its transaction volume more than doubled
between 2005 and 2007 (from 150 million euros to 350 million
euros). They believe, however, that the volume in 2008 will
not surpass the volume from 2007.

THINK TANKS/OUTREACH
--------------------

10. (SBU) Schulte met with small but interested groups of
acedemics and journalists at the Hellenic Foundation for
European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and the Institute for
International Relations (IIR) to discuss the broad two-track
strategy with Iran. Two overlapping issues at both events
were the effect of a new U.S. administration and the
effectiveness of sanctions. Schulte stressed that six more
months of Iran violating Security Council resolutions will
not be looked upon favorably by any administration, thus Iran
should not wait. On sanctions, Amb Schulte said there is
evidence that sanctions are causing debate among the Iranian
leadership, but stressed the importance of a two-track
approach.

11. (U) Both organizations - ELIAMEP with its seasoned
commentators and IIR with its younger University of Athens
audience - are featuring Schulte's visit on their websites.

ELIAMEP will post a transcript jointly produced with the
Embassy. Meanwhile, elite SKAI TV ran the exclusive interview
with Schulte in primetime on the night of his visit.
Influential To Vima newspaper reported on the visit the next
day. Additional local coverage could develop when Iran
responds to the Geneva encounter. See also
http://athens.usembassy.gov.

12.(U) This cable has been cleared by UNVIE.
SPECKHARD

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2-9-2011

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